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I. INTRODUCTION
"[S]tate investigators discovered large trenches and pits
filled with freeflowing, multi-colored, pungent liquid
wastes .... Thousands of dented and corroded drums
containing a veritable potpourri of toxic fluids were dis-
covered .... Many were found intact but many had rup-
tured spilling chemicals into the soil."'
Hazardous waste2 has been dumped for decades. 3 Only rela-
tively recently, Congress enacted legislation to combat hazardous
waste pollution.4 Among such legislation is the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA). 5 CERCLA liability is broad 6 and the statutory de-
fenses are narrow. 7 Therefore, potentially responsible parties
1. O'Neill v. Picillo, 682 F. Supp. 706, 709, 725 (D.R.I. 1988).
2. Although CERCLA uses the term "hazardous substances" only, this
Comment uses "hazardous waste" and "hazardous substances" interchangeably.
3. Developments in the Law- Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1459,
1462 (1986) [hereinafter Toxic Waste Litigation].
4. Id. at 1469.
5. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980 § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1982) [hereinafter CERCLA].
6. Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 3, at 1513. For a discussion of CERCLA
liability, see infra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
7. For a discussion of defenses to CERCLA liability, see infra notes 66-71
and accompanying text.
2
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(PRPs)8 have attempted to distribute such liability through con-
tractual releases 9 of environmental liabilities. 10
This Comment will focus on contractual releases of CERCLA
liability. In particular, this Comment will discuss two threshold
issues: the applicable law" and the validity of contractual re-
leases. 2 Finally, this Comment will discuss the two prevailing in-
terpretations of section 107(e)(1) which regulates the contractual
release of CERCLA liability.' 3
II. BACKGROUND
A. Common Law Remedies to Hazardous Waste
Before the promulgation of CERCLA and other statutes reg-
ulating hazardous waste, 14 the only remedies available to parties
exposed to hazardous waste were common law tort actions.' 5 In-
deed, the common law is still the only remedy for these victims.'
6
The relevant common law actions include trespass, nuisance, neg-
ligence and strict liability.17
Common law actions for exposure to hazardous waste pres-
ent three difficulties.' First, statutes of limitations generally re-
quire the commencement of the action within two to four years
after the defendant commits the tortious act.' 9 A potential plain-
8. PRP is a term of art for potentially responsible party under CERCLA
section 107(a). For a discussion of PRPs, see infra notes 61-64 and accompany-
ing text.
9. For the purposes of this Comment, "contractual releases" will include:
indemnities, releases, hold harmless agreements, exculpatory clauses and dis-
claimers. "Contractual release" and "release" will be used interchangeably.
10. For a discussion of other means to circumvent CERCLA liability, see
infra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 91-158 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 159-161 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 162-206 and accompanying text.
14. Other statutes that regulate hazardous waste are the Resource Conser-
vation and Recovery Act of 1976 § 3001, 42 U.S.C. § 6921 (1982) [hereinafter
RCRA] and the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 300f (1982).
15. Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 3, at 1467.
16. Id. at 1602. The United States Supreme Court struck down an implied
right of action based on violation of a federal environmental statute. Id. (citing
Middlesex County Sewage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1,
11-18 (1981)). The United States Supreme Court also prohibits private party
recovery for damages due to environmental waste exposure under a nuisance
cause of action. National Sea Clammers Ass 'n, 453 U.S. at 21-22; City of Milwaukee
v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981).
17. Id. at 1610.
18. Id. at 1603-04.
19. Id. at 1604.
1992] 349
3
Aydelott: Cerclaing the Issues: Making Sense of Contractual Liability Under
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992
350 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. III: p. 347
tiff, however, may not realize she has been exposed until a physi-
cal condition manifests itself.20 Manifestation of the physical
condition may not occur until long after the statute of limitations
has run.2' Second, the plaintiff in a common law suit for hazard-
ous waste exposure will have difficulty proving negligence. 22 The
plaintiff will have to prove that the defendant's act or omission
was unreasonable or that she was a foreseeable plaintiff.2 3 Both
of these elements are difficult to prove when neither the plaintiff
nor the judge have expertise in environmental technology.24
Third, the plaintiff will have difficulty proving causation.2 5 The
plaintiff must prove that the hazardous substances caused her in-
juries and that the defendant released the hazardous substance.26
In these cases, proving causation is problematic because of both
the latency of the manifestation of the injury27 and the need to
rely on epidemiological studies.28
The burden placed on the plaintiff who has been exposed to
hazardous substances makes recovery for such exposure insur-
mountable.2 9 In addition, because toxic tort cases are so difficult
to win, these cases have had little effect in abating the rampant
problem of hazardous waste.30
B. Congressional Remedies to Hazardous Waste
In the 1950's and 1960's, Congress enacted several environ-
mental statutes, none of which dealt with the problem of hazard-
ous waste. 31 Hazardous waste was not a priority for three
20. Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 3, at 1604.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1611.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1612.
25. Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 3, at 1617.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1618. It may be difficult to find the parties responsible for the
release of hazardous waste because of the latency of the injuries from exposure
to such substances. Id.
28. Id. at 1618. Epidemiological studies compare a population exposed to
a hazardous substance with a population that has not been exposed. Id. The
difficulty with epidemiological studies is that they do not prove that the plain-
tiff's injuries came about from the particular hazardous waste studied; the stud-
ies merely prove that the hazardous substance may cause such injuries. Id. at
1619.
29. Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 3, at 1630.
30. Id.
31. Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 3, at 1469. Among the noteworthy stat-
utes and amendments during the 1950's, 1960's and 1970's are the following:
Clean Air Act of 1955, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (codified as amended at
4
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reasons: (1) hazardous substances are not generally visible to the
naked eye; (2) there was a lack of monitoring devices to detect
hazardous contamination; and (3) the public did not realize the
grave consequences of exposure to hazardous substances.32
To alleviate this growing concern, Congress enacted the Safe
Drinking Water Act of 1974.33 This act empowered the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) to establish standards for drink-
ing water, a system to ensure compliance, and state guidelines for
the regulation of hazardous waste.34 The Act, however, failed to
deal with hazardous waste contamination other than through
water consumption and failed to address the need for safe means
of hazardous waste storage.3 5 To redress these omissions, Con-
gress enacted the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of
1976 (RCRA).36
RCRA acts prospectively in that it regulates hazardous waste
created after 1976.37 RCRA tracks hazardous substances from
creation to disposal.38 The Act imposes a manifest system.3 9 A
"manifest," or label, is placed on each barrel of hazardous sub-
stances.40 Each generator and transporter records on the label
what it did with the barrels, thus tracking the substances from
"cradle-to-grave. ' '4 ' RCRA also requires that all hazardous sub-
stances be disposed, stored or treated in permitted facilities. 42
Additionally, RCRA imposes a duty on generators and transport-
ers of hazardous substances to report to state and federal agen-
cies the substance involved and the amount of the waste created,
transported and disposed.43 One shortcoming of RCRA is that it
42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1991)); National Emissions Standards Act of 1967, Pub. L.
No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (1982); Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86
Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1982)).
32. Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 3, at 1469-70.
33. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f (1982), also known as the Public Health Service Act,
PHSA §§ 1401 (1979).
34. Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 3, at 1470.
35. Id.
36. RCRA § 3001, 42 U.S.C. § 6921. RCRA is incorporated in subchapter
III of the Solid Waste Disposal Act § 1002, 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1980).
37. Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 3, at 1464.
38. Id. at 1470-71.
39. RCRA § 3002(a)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 6922(a)(5).
40. Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 3, at 1471.
41. Id. at 1470-71.
42. Id.
43. RCRA § 3 002(a)(6), 42 U.S.C. § 6922(a)(6).
1992]
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fails to regulate hazardous waste disposed of before 1976.4 4 To
that end, Congress enacted CERCLA to cleanup such hazardous
waste sites.45
While RCRA is prospective in tracking hazardous substances,
CERCLA is retrospective in that it was enacted to clean up sites
that already contain hazardous waste. 4 6 CERCLA was enacted in
1980 during the final stages of the Carter Administration. 47 To
avoid a veto, Congress hastily passed the bill before Ronald Rea-
gan took office as President.48 Congress, it has been said, enacted
"perhaps the most radical environmental statute in American his-
tory." 4 9 In addition to the Act itself being "radical" the courts
have expanded the radical nature of CERCLA by interpreting its
provisions broadly. 50
Congress enacted CERCLA in order to establish a rapid envi-
ronmental response program to protect public health and the en-
vironment. 5' CERCLA requires the EPA to establish a National
Priority List of those sites that need to be cleaned up and a Na-
tional Contingency Plan to carry out the cleanups. 52 CERCLA set
up a "Superfund" which finances the hazardous waste cleanup
costs incurred by the government. 53
44. Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 3, at 1464.
45. Id. at 1472.
46. Id. at 1464.
47. Id. at 1,465 n.l.
48. Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 3, at 1465 n.1. Several courts have ac-
knowledged that Congress enacted CERCLA hastily. United States v. Mottolo,
605 F. Supp. 898, 902, 905 (D.N.H. 1985); United States v. A & F Materials Co.,
578 F. Supp. 1249, 1253 (S.D. Ill. 1984).
49. Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 3, at 1465.
50. Id. at 1465-66. See Mobay Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 345,
350 (D.N.J. 1991) (To achieve CERCLA's remedial goals of protecting public
health and environment, courts are "obligated to construe its provisions liber-
ally.") (quoting Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d
1074, 1081 (1st Cir. 1986)). In New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032
(2d Cir. 1985), the Second Circuit held that causation was not required to im-
pose liability on responsible parties. Id. at 1044-45. Also, for example, in
United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust, Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986),
the United States District Court for the District of Maryland held that a bank
which presently owned a hazardous waste site through foreclosure was liable
under CERCLA. Id. at 579.
51. H.R. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1, at 17 (1980), reprinted in (1980)
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6119-20. [hereinafter H.R. 1016]; see Mobay, 761 F. Supp. at
349; United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 805 (S.D. Ohio
1983).
52. CERCLA § 105, 42 U.S.C. § 9605.
53. CERCLA § 111 (a), 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (a); H.R. 1016, supra note 51, at 17.
The "Superfund" is a fund set up by Congress from taxes on petroleum, feed-
stock chemicals, other chemical products, and from the general United States
6
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Once EPA has determined that there has been a release or a
threatened release54 of hazardous substances, EPA has two op-
tions.55 The EPA can (1) clean up the site using the Superfund
money56 and then seek recovery for the costs incurred from the
PRPs or (2) require the PRPs to clean up the site. 57 A private
party whose property has been contaminated also has two op-
tions. 58 It can (1) clean up the site and seek recovery of the costs
incurred from EPA Superfund 59 or (2) clean up the site and seek
recovery of the costs incurred from the responsible parties. 60
revenues. JOHN H. DAVIDSON & ORLANDO E. DELOGU, FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION, Issue 2 (1991). The Hazardous Substance Superfund had in its cof-
fers $5,100,000,000.00 as of October 1, 1991. CERCLA § 1 1 (a), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9611 (a).
54. For the language of CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 see infra note 61.
55. Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 3, at 1485.
Although the procedural framework of CERCLA is difficult to decipher,
it apparently sets out four basic routes to cleanup: (1) direct EPA
cleanup under section 104 followed by potential recovery of costs from
the responsible parties under section 107; (2) EPA-mandated cleanup
by potentially responsible parties under section 106; (3) private party
cleanup followed by recovery against the Fund under section 112; and
(4) private party cleanup followed by recovery against the responsible
parties under section 107.
Id.
56. CERCLA § 104(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(b)(1).
57. Section 106(a)(2) states in pertinent part: "Any person who receives
and complies with the terms of any order issued under subsection (a) ["when the
President determines that there may be ... an actual or threatened release of a
hazardous substance"] [ ] may . . . petition the President for reimbursement
from the Fund for the reasonable costs of such action ...... CERCLA
§ 106(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a)(2).
58. Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 3, at 1497. H.R. 1016, supra note 51, at
17. The EPA is empowered "to pursue rapid recovery of the costs incurred for
the costs of such actions undertaken by [the administrator] from persons liable
therefor and to induce such persons voluntarily to pursue appropriate environ-
mental response actions with respect to hazardous waste sites." H.R. 1016,
supra note 51, at 17.
59. See supra note 57.
60. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
19921 353
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1. Liability Under CERCLA
CERCLA section 10761 sets out a broad scope of liability.62
The Act imposes strict liability on the owner or operator of a haz-
ardous waste site; any person who owned or operated the site
when the hazardous waste was disposed at the site; any person
who arranged for disposal or treatment of the waste; and any per-
son who accepted to transport the hazardous waste. 63 Thus,
CERCLA covers four classes of persons who are engaged in the
production/transportation/disposal cycle of hazardous waste:
past and present owners, operators, transporters and genera-
tors.64 These persons are liable for the removal costs, other costs
incident to the cleanup, and damages for injury to the destruction
of natural resources. 65
2. Defenses to CERCLA Liability
PRPs under CERCLA have three limited66 defenses: "an act
of God, an act of war, or an act or omission of a third party."
67
61. Section 107(a) states in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject
only to the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section-
(1) the owner or operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous sub-
stance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous sub-
stances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged
for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport
for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed
by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incinera-
tion vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and containing
such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances
for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or
sites selected by such person from which there is a release or
threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a
hazardous substance, shall be liable for-
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United
States Government or a State...
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural re-
sources ....
CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. 9607(a).
62. Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 3, at 1513.
63. H.R. 1016, supra note 51, at 33.
64. Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 3, at 1514.
65. CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607.
66. Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 3, at 1544-45.
67. Section 107(b) states in pertinent part:
Defenses
There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this section for a
8
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The Second Circuit in New York v. Shore Realty Corp.68 held that
each of these defenses "carves out from liability an exception
based on causation." 69 The court reasoned that requiring a
showing of causation in the prima facie case was superfluous. 70
Therefore, the defendants have the burden of proving causation
under the 107(b) defenses. 71
C. The Confusion Regarding Contractual Releases of
Environmental Liability
Because CERCLA imposes strict liability and provides lim-
ited defenses, responsible parties have sought to avoid environ-
mental liability through contractual releases. 72  Contractual
releases implicate section 107(e) of CERCIA. Section 107(e)
states in full:
(1) No indemnification, hold harmless, or similar agree-
ment or conveyance shall be effective to transfer
from the owner or operator of any vessel or facility
or from any person who may be liable for a release
or threat of release under this section, to any other
person the liability imposed under this section.
Nothing in this subsection shall bar any agreement
person otherwise liable who can establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that the release or threat of release of a hazardous substance
and the damages resulting therefrom were caused solely by-
(1) an act of God;
(2) an act of war;
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or
agent of the defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in
connection with a contractual relationship, existing directly or indi-
rectly, with the defendant ... if the defendant establishes by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that (a) he exercised due care with respect to
the hazardous substance concerned, taking into consideration the char-
acteristics of such hazardous substance, in light of all relevant facts and
circumstances, and (b) he took precautions against foreseeable acts or
omissions of any such third party and the consequences that could
foreseeably result from such acts or omissions; or
(4) any combination of the foregoing paragraphs.
CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. 9607(b).
68. New York v. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
69. Id. at 1044.
70. Id.
71. Id. The defendant has the burden of proving these defenses by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. Id.
72. Responsible parties have also attempted to circumvent CERCLA liabil-
ity through procedural requirements under section 104. For a more detailed
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to insure, hold harmless, or indemnify a party to
such agreement for any liability under this section.
(2) Nothing in this subchapter, including the provisions
of paragraph (1) of this subsection, shall bar a cause
of action that an owner or operator or any other per-
son subject to liability under this section, or a guar-
antor, has or would have, by reason of subrogation
or otherwise against any person.7 3
The first sentence of section 107(e)(1) appears to prohibit all
contractual releases. The second sentence of section 107(e)(1),
on the other hand, appears to permit contractual releases. Addi-
tionally, section 107(e)(2) appears to emphasize that a responsi-
ble party can bring a cause of action against another party.74
Confusion stems from three levels of disagreement about the ef-
fect of CERCLA on contractual releases. First, courts are split in
determining the law to apply to determine the validity of releases
in the context of CERCLA section 107(e). 75 Most courts hold
that Congress intended federal common law to govern liability
issues.76 However, courts are split over whether state law or fed-
erally created law should provide the content of the federal com-
mon law. 77 Second, courts disagree about whether a particular
73. CERCLA § 107(e), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e).
74. Also, the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, 42
U.S.C. § 6901 (1986) [hereinafter SARA] added to CERCLA a provision ex-
pressly permitting a responsible party to seek contribution from any other re-
sponsible party. CERCLA § 113(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (1988). The section
states as follows:
Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is
liable or potentially liable under section 9607(a) of this title, during or
following any civil action under section 9606 of this title or under sec-
tion 9607(a) of this title. Such claims ... shall be governed by Federal
law. In resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate response
costs among liable parties using such equitable factors as the court de-
termines are appropriate. Nothing in this subsection shall diminish the
right of any person to bring an action for contribution in the absence of
a civil action under section 9606 of this title or section 9607 of this title.
CERCLA § 113(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0.
75. For a discussion of the applicable law, see infra notes 91-158.
76. The governing case is Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown Ry., 342
U.S. 359, 361 (1952).
77. Several courts use state law to interpret CERCLA liability and the con-
tractual release for various reasons. See Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd.,
804 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986); Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Kop-Coat, Inc., 750 F.
Supp. 1022 (N.D. Cal. 1990), rev'don other grounds sub nom.Jones-Hamilton Co. v.
Beazer Materials & Servs., Inc., 1992 WL 44492 (9th Cir. March 12, 1992); In-
ternational Clinical Lab. v. Stevens, 710 F. Supp. 466 (E.D.N.Y. 1989); Versatile
Metals, Inc. v. Union Corp., 693 F. Supp. 1563 (E.D. Pa. 1988); Lyncott Corp. v.
Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 1409 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
10
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release covers CERCLA liability when the release was entered
into before CERCLA was enacted or when the release does not
expressly mention environmental liability.78 Some courts hold
that to validate release of CERCLA liability, the release must have
been entered into after CERCLA was enacted and must expressly
include a release of CERCLA liabilities. 79 Third, courts are split
as to the proper interpretation of the two seemingly conflicting
sentences of section 107(e)(1). 80 In Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music,
Ltd.,81 the Ninth Circuit interpreted the provision to mean that
private parties can release liability between themselves but cannot
avoid reimbursing the government for cleanup costs. 82 In AM
Some courts apply state law to interpret the release itself and federal law to
interpret CERCLA. See AM Int'l v. International Forging Equip., 743 F. Supp.
525 (N.D. Ohio 1990); Southland Corp. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 994
(D.N.J. 1988). For further discussion of whether state or federal law should ap-
ply, see infra notes 91-158 and accompanying text.
78. See Mobay Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 345, 358 (D.N.J.
1991). In Mobay, the court held that where the release was entered into prior to
the enactment of CERCLA, in order for the court to find a waiver of CERCLA
liability, the release must mention the acceptance of "environmental-type" lia-
bilities. Id. at 358. See also Southland, 696 F. Supp. at 1002. The Southland court
held that the release language must expressly include hazardous waste liability.
Id. The court stated that "[tihe Agreement between Southland and Ashland is
completely lacking in any language which expressly releases Ashland from fu-
ture liabilities based on its hazardous waste disposal practices or imposes this
liability on Southland. To imply such an agreement would require the court to
engage in 'judicial legislation that would reshape CERCLA's liability scheme.'"
Id. (quoting Chemical Waste Management v. Armstrong World Indus., 669 F.
Supp. 1285, 1294 (E.D. Pa. 1987)). Other courts have held that express lan-
guage referring to hazardous waste liability is not required in order for the court
to find a transfer of CERCLA liability. See Jones-Hamilton, 750 F. Supp. at 1027.
The Jones-Hamilton court determined that the release does not have to include
"CERCLA-type" liabilities. Id. Accord AM Int'l, 743 F. Supp. at 530. In addition,
in AM International the court held that the release encompasses CERCLA liability
even though the release does not so state. AM Int'l, 743 F. Supp. at 530.
79. Rodenbeck v. Marathon Petroleum Co., 742 F. Supp. 1448, 1457 (N.D.
Ind. 1990); Chemical Waste Management v. Armstrong World Indus., 669 F.
Supp. 1285, 1294-95 (E.D. Pa. 1987); FMC Corp. v. Northern Pump Co., 668 F.
Supp. 1285, 1292 (D. Minn. 1987). For a discussion of the interpretation of
contractual releases, see infra notes 158-160.
80. See Penny L. Parker & John Slavich, Contractual Efforts to Allocate the Risk
of Environmental Liability: Is There a Way to Make Indemnities Worth More Than the
Paper They Are Written On?, 44 Sw. L.J. 1349, 1361 (1991) [hereinafter Parker &
Slavich].
81. 804 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986). See infra notes 165-170 and accompany-
ing text.
82. Id. at 1459; accord Purolator Products Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 772 F.
Supp. 124 (W.D.N.Y. 1991); Niecko v. Emro Mktg. Co., 769 F. Supp. 973 (E.D.
Mich. 1991). For a discussion of Purolator Products, see infra notes 171-177 and
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International v. International Forging Co. ,83 the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Ohio held that releases be-
tween liable parties are generally invalid, but are valid between a
PRP and those who would not otherwise be liable under
CERCLA.8 4
These three levels of disagreement are important to hazard-
ous waste litigation because CERCLA's power is expansive.8 5
CERCLA imposes broad liability and affords only three narrow
exceptions to such liability.8 6 When faced with huge cleanup
costs and an action for compensation, PRPs may be forced to de-
clare bankruptcy in order to avoid liability.8 7 Another means to
circumvent liability is through insurance coverage.88 Insurance
companies, however, are designing specific policies with specific
coverage periods which may not cover the PRPs' liability.8 9 A
third means to circumvent liability is to include a contractual re-
lease of environmental liability in the contract of sale for the haz-
ardous waste site. 90
III. THE APPLICABLE LAw
The threshold issue is which law to apply to interpret section
107(e)(1). As a matter of statutory interpretation, where a statute
is ambiguous, the court should look to legislative history. 9'
CERCLA section 107(e)(1) is clearly ambiguous because it con-
tains two inconsistent sentences. 92 CERCLA's legislative history
indicates that where liability issues are unclear, traditional com-
mon law principles apply.93 Courts typically have determined
that the legislative history refers to federal common law.94
83. 743 F. Supp. 525 (N.D. Ohio 1990). For a discussion of AM Int'l, see
infra notes 186-202 and accompanying text.
84. Id. at 529.
85. Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 3, at 1465-66.
86. For a discussion of CERCLA liability and defenses, see supra notes 61-
71 and accompanying text.
87. Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 3, at 1585.
88. Id. at 1574.
89. Id. at 1577.
90. See Parker & Slavich, supra note 80, at 1349.
91. Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 3, at 1525.
92. For a discussion of CERCLA section 107(e)(l), see supra note 73 and
accompanying text.
93. 126 CONG. REC. 30,932 (1980). A sponsor of CERCLA, Senator Ran-
dolph, stated that "[i]t is intended that issues of liability not resolved by this act,
if any, shall be governed by traditional and evolving principles of common law."
Id.
94. Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 3, at 1526. See Mobay Corp. v. Allied-
12
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Next, the court must determine the content of the federal
common law.95 Even though federal law governs, courts are not
required to use federal rules of decision. 96 Instead, courts may
use state common law to give the federal common law its con-
tent.97 Courts are split as to whether judges should develop a
uniform federal rule of decision or incorporate state law to pro-
vide the content of the federal common law. 98
In United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc. ,99 the Supreme Court in-
troduced a test to remedy this conflict. 00 Kimbell Foods concerns
priority of liens. In particular, the Court discusses whether gov-
ernment liens have priority over private party liens.' 0 ' The
threshold issue is whether a uniform federal rule of decision
Signal, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 345, 351 (D.N.J. 1991) ("Federal law always governs
the validity of releases of federal causes of action.") (citing Dice v. Akron, Can-
ton & Youngstown Ry., 342 U.S. 359, 361 (1952)); accord Mardan Corp. v.
C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1457 (9th Cir. 1986).
95. See United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 727 (1979);
Mobay, 761 F. Supp. at 351; See Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 3, at 1526.
96. See United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 808 (S.D.
Ohio 1983) ("State law as a rule of decision is not mandated under the Erie
doctrine in this case because it falls within the exception provided for federal
laws") (citation omitted).
97. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 727-28; Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1457.
98. For a discussion of Chem-Dyne and Mobay, which apply federal rules of
decision to give CERCLA its content, and Mardan, which applies state law to give
CERCLA its content, see infra notes 110-157 and accompanying text.
99. 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
100. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728-29. The Supreme Court asserted that
"[flederal law ... controls the Government's priority rights." Id. at 727. How-
ever, because Congress failed to express its intent as to whether to incorporate
state law or create a uniform federal law, the Court applied the three-part test to
determine if state law is appropriate. Id. at 727-29. The Court explained that
when Congress fails to state whether federal law or state law governs, federal
courts are to fill in the gaps left by the federal statute "according to their own
standards." Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 727 (quoting Clearfield Trust Co. v.
United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943)). Thus, Kimbell Foods applies to cases
where Congress failed to expressly delineate whether federal law or state law
should be applied. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 727. Kimbell Foods is applicable in
contractual release cases under CERCLA section 107(e)(1) because Congress
did not expressly state which type of law should be applied to give content to
CERCLA. See Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1458; Mobay, 761 F. Supp. at 351.
101. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 718. This case is a combination of two cases.
In the first case, O.K. Super Market had two liens against its personal property.
Id. The first lien on O.K. Super Market's property was held by a private corpora-
tion. Id. O.K. Super Market obtained a loan through the Small Business Admin-
istration (SBA), under the SBA, and this is the basis for the second government
lien. Id. The private lien preceded the government's lien. Id.
In the second case, Ralph Bridges, a farmer, obtained loans from the Farm-
ers Home Administration (FHA) under the Consolidated Farmers Home Admin-
istration Act of 1961. Id. at 723. The FHA had a security interest in Bridges'
property and farm equipment. Id. Bridges failed to pay for his tractor repairs.
Id. The repairman kept the tractor and obtained a lien on it. Id. Bridges filed
1992] 359
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should be created or whether state common law should provide
the content of the federal common law used to interpret the gov-
erning federal statute.10 2 The Court looked to see whether Con-
gress stated explicitly that federal rules of decision would
govern. 103 Because Congress failed to state explicitly that federal
rules of decision should give the federal common law its content,
the Court developed a three-part test. 0 4 Under that test, a court
must apply state law unless: (1) the issue, by its nature, requires
uniform federal rules; (2) state law would frustrate the objective
of the federal law; or (3) uniform federal rules would frustrate
commercial relationships.' 0 5 Under the three-part test, the Kim-
bell Foods Court held that state law applied.'0 6 The Court
reasoned that applying state law would not frustrate the adminis-
tration of government loan programs because these loan pro-
grams were incorporated into state law.' 0 7 Also, the Court did
not want to create more uncertainty by developing uniform fed-
for bankruptcy and was discharged of his debts. Id. The United States brought
a cause of action against the repairman for the tractor. Id. at 724.
Neither the SBA nor the Consolidated Farmers Home Administration Act
contained provisions dealing with the priority of liens. Id. at 723. Thus, the
issue for the Court was whether a uniform federal law or state common law ap-
plied. Id. at 727.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 740.
104. Id. at 728-29. The Court sets out the Kimbell Foods test as follows:
Whether to adopt state law or to fashion a nationwide federal rule is a
matter of judicial policy 'dependent upon a variety of considerations
always relevant to the nature of the specific governmental interests, and
to the effects upon them of applying state law.'
Undoubtedly, federal programs that 'by their nature are and must
be uniform in character throughout the Nation' necessitate formulation
of controlling federal rules. Conversely, when there is little need for a
nationally uniform body of law, state law may be incorporated as the
federal rule of decision. Apart from considerations of uniformity, we
must also determine whether application of state law would frustrate
specific objectives of the federal programs. If so, we must fashion spe-
cial rules solicitous of those federal interests. Finally, our choice-of-law
inquiry must consider the extent to which application of a federal rule
would disrupt commercial relationships predicated on state law.
Id. (citations and footnotes omitted).
Had Congress stated that federal law should be applied, then the Court
would have applied federal law.
105. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728-29. For a discussion of Chem-Dyne, see
infra notes 116-127 and accompanying text. See also Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C Mu-
sic, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1458-60 (9th Cir. 1986); Mobay Corp. v. Allied-Signal,
Inc., 761 F. Supp. 345, 351-52 (D.NJ. 1991); United States v. Chem-Dyne
Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 809 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
106. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 740.
107. Id. at 729-30.
14
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eral rules when state law already exists. 0 8 Additionally, the
Court found no national interest compelling the application of
federal law. 0 9
Although the facts of Kimbell Foods are not on point, the case
is important because the Court developed the three-part test to
determine which law applies to give federal common law its con-
tent. Because Congress did not specify in the legislative history
of CERCLA whether courts should develop uniform federal rules
or allow state law to give CERCLA its content, the three-part test
in Kimbell Foods is implicated.I 10
A. Analytical Application of United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc.
A number of courts have analyzed the Kimbell Foods test in
relation to CERCLA liability. In United States v. Chem-Dyne
Corp.,"' the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio ap-
plied the Kimbell Foods test in relation to general liability under
CERCLA and determined that uniform federal rules of decision
should be applied to interpret CERCLA's liability provisions." t2
The Mobay Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc. 1"3 decision is an example of a
case that followed the Chem-Dyne analysis and extended its hold-
ing to the area of contractual releases and CERCLA liability. In
Mobay, the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey also applied uniform federal rules of decision to give
CERCLA its content in relation to contractual releases of envi-
108. Id. at 738-39. The Court stated in part:
In structuring financial transactions, businessmen depend on state
commercial law to provide the stability essential for reliable evaluation
of the risks involved. However, subjecting federal contractual liens to
the doctrines developed in the tax lien area could undermine that sta-
bility. Creditors who justifiably rely on state law to obtain superior
liens would have their expectations thwarted whenever a federal con-
tractual security interest suddenly appeared and took precedence.
Id. at 739. (citations omitted).
109. Id.
110. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 727.
111. 572 F. Supp. 802.
112. Id. at 808-09. The court was not faced with the issue whether federal
or state law should give CERCLA its content in relation to contractual releases.
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ronmental liabilities."l 4 In Mardan Corp. v. C. G. C. Music, Ltd.," 1
on the other hand, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit used state law to interpret CERCLA. l" 6
1. The United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp. Analysis: Federal
Rules of Decision Provide Content for CERCLA
The seminal case in determining which law to apply to give
CERCLA its content is United States v. Cher-Dyne Corp. "17 In this
case the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Ohio applied federal rules of decision to interpret CERCLA lia-
bility."t 8 The United States brought an action under CERCIA to
compel twenty-four defendants to reimburse the government for
the cleanup of hazardous waste at the Chem-Dyne plant." s9 De-
fendant, Chem-Dyne Corporation, moved for summary judgment
claiming that it was not jointly and severally liable under
CERCLA. 12° The court noted that CERCLA's legislative history
states that federal common law applies in interpreting the scope
of CERCLA liability because regulating hazardous substances is
"of national magnitude involving uniquely federal interests."' 2 '
In addition, Congress enacted CERCLA because state response
114. Id. at 351-52. The United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of California applied federal law to interpret CERCLA in relation to a con-
tractual release. Wiegmann & Rose Int'l v. NL Indus., 735 F. Supp. 957, 962
(N.D. Cal. 1990). However, the court did not analyze the Kimbell Foods test in
order to come to that conclusion. Id. The court also stressed that the conclu-
sion the court reached would not be different under state law. Id. at 962 n.4.
115. 804 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986).
116. Id. at 1458-59.
117. 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983). Although this case applied federal
common law to CERCLA liability in general, it did not specifically refer to sec-
tion 107(e)(l). See also Mobay, 761 F. Supp. at 351-52; Lyncott Corp. v. Chemical
Waste Management, 690 F. Supp. 1409, 1417 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
118. Chemi-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 808-09. A "uniform federal law" is law
created by the federal judiciary. The law created by the federal judiciary is uni-
form because federal laws go beyond state boundaries. In addition, the United
States Supreme Court may elect to pass judgement on the law and make it bind-
ing in all circuits.
119. Id. at 804.
120. Id. The District Court denied Chem-Dyne's motion because it found
that Chem-Dyne failed to prove that there exists no material issues of fact. Id. at
811.
121. Id. at 808. The court points out that the "Erie doctrine" created by the
Supreme Court in Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), extinguished the fed-
eral government's power to create a federal common law. Chem-Dyne, 572 F.
Supp. at 808. However, Erie does not proscribe creating a specialized federal
common law when it is "necessary to protect uniquely federal interests." Id.
(quoting Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981)).
16
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol3/iss2/4
CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA
to hazardous waste was lacking.122
The court then addressed the issue whether a uniform fed-
eral rule or state law should give CERCLA its content. 2 3 Apply-
ing the Kimbell Foods test, the court found that CERCLA is a
federal program which by its nature necessitates applying uniform
federal rules of decision.' 2 4 In support of this holding, the court
cited to a statement in the legislative history made by United
States Representative James Florio (D-NJ)' 2 5 that federal rules of
decision should give CERCLA its content. 126 Additionally, the
court noted that using state law to give CERCLA its content
would frustrate the rapid cleanup of hazardous waste sites be-
cause state laws would not be uniform. 27 More importantly, the
Congressional Committee on Energy and Commerce adopted the
Chem-Dyne analysis in 1986.128
2. The Mobay Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc. Analysis: Federal
Rules of Decision Provide Content for CERCLA
In a more recent case, the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey applied a uniform federal rule of decision
where the parties entered into a contractual release of CERCLA
liability.' 2 9 In Mobay Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., Mobay, the present
owner of a hazardous waste site, brought a cause of action against
the former owners for contribution under CERCLA section 107
and section 113.130 Allied-Signal, one of the former owners of
122. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 808.
123. Id. at 809.
124. Id.
125. Representative Florio was a sponsor of the CERCLA bill. Id. at 807.
While statements of a single congressman are not controlling, a statement by a
sponsor of the legislation is afforded "substantial weight." Id.
126. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 809. Representative Florio stated that
"[t]o insure the development of a uniform rule of law, and to discourage busi-
ness dealing in hazardous substances from locating primarily in States with more
lenient laws, [CERCLA] will encourage the further development of a Federal
common law in this area." Id. (quoting 126 CONG. REC. H 11787 (Dec. 3, 1980)).
127. Id.
128. H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 74 reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2856; see Niecko v. Emro Mktg. Co., 769 F. Supp. 973, 987
(E.D. Mich. 1991). In effect, Congress meant that federal rules of decision are to
give CERCLA its content in relation to liability.
129. Mobay Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 345, 351-52 (D.N.J.
1991). This court follows the reasoning in judge Reinhardt's dissent in Mardan.
Id.
130. For a discussion of CERCLA section 113 see supra, note 74. The
owner also asserted a number of state claims including strict liability in tort,
negligence, restitution, contribution, indemnification, and contractual breach of
warranties and representations. Id. at 348.
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the site, alleged, inter alia, that the contractual release transferred
CERCLA liability to Mobay, and that Allied-Signal was no longer
liable under CERCLA.' 3 ' The court held that Allied-Signal could
not rely on the contractual release because it did not include clear
language of a transfer of CERCIA liability.' 3 2 Therefore, the
court concluded that Mobay could pursue its contribution
claim. 33
The Mobay court noted that CERCLA's legislative history
"strongly suggests a Congressional directive to federal courts to
develop uniform federal rules, [however] CERCLA does not con-
tain a specific assertion of Congressional intent."' 3 4 The court
failed to find a clear Congressional intent to implement a federal
rule of decision, and thus, applied the Kimbell Foods three-part
test. 3 5 The court found that under the first element, 3 6 uniform-
ity of federal law is "necessary to prevent the vagaries of differing
state laws from affecting the incentive for voluntary cleanup."' 3 7
Additionally, the court pointed out that CERCLA demonstrates
the "substantial federal interest" in reducing hazardous sub-
stances.' 3 8 Examining the second element, 3 9 the court found
that applying state law would frustrate CERCLA's objective of
rapid response to hazardous waste cleanup because state law
would not be able to enforce contribution.' 40 Therefore, state
131. Id. at 348-49.
132. Id. at 358. For a discussion of the interpretation of the release itself,
see infra notes 159-161.
133. Id.
134. Mobay, 761 F. Supp. at 351.
135. Id. at 351-52. See supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
136. For the Kimbell Foods test, see supra notes 99-105 and accompanying
text.
137. Mobay, 761 F. Supp. at 351 (citing Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd.,
804 F.2d 1454, 1464 (9th Cir. 1986) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting)); see United
States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193, 1202 (E.D. Pa. 1989); United States v.
Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615, 624 (D.N.H. 1988); In re Acushnet River & New Bed-
ford Harbor Proceedings, 675 F. Supp. 22, 31 (D. Mass. 1987).
138. Mobay, 761 F. Supp. at 351 (citing United States v. A & F Materials
Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1255 (S.D. Ill. 1984)).
139. For the Kimbell Foods test, see supra note 99-105 and accompanying
text.
140. Mobay, 761 F. Supp. at 351-52 (citing Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1465 (Rein-
hardt, J., dissenting)). See also Wiegmann & Rose Int'l v. NL Indus., 735 F. Supp.
957, 962 (N.D. Cal. 1990). Under state law the court would not be able to en-
force contribution because if the present owner of a hazardous waste site has no
power to enforce contribution on a former owner, the present owner may delay
cleanup until the government initiated the cleanup. Mlobay, 761 F. Supp. at 351-
52. The court noted two disadvantages: "[f]irst, the government's ability to
monitor numerous sites and initiate cleanups on a nationwide basis is con-
strained by limited resources. Second, government action is supposed to be a
18
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law would create a disincentive for the present owner to volunta-
rily cleanup the hazardous waste.' 4 1 Applying the third ele-
ment, 142 the court found that establishing a federal rule of
decision would not frustrate commercial relationships based on
state law because "federal law always governs the validity of re-
leases of federal causes of action."' 43 The court noted that re-
leases of CERCLA liability "must be prepared in light of
applicable federal law regarding other CERCLA provisions."' 144
Therefore, the Mobay court held that federal common law should
govern CERCLA contractual releases.145
3. The Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd. Analysis: State
Common Law Provides Content for CERCLA
Despite the persuasive uniform federal rule of decision argu-
ment, some federal courts still apply state common law.' 46 In
Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd.,"147 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, like the courts in Chem-Dyne and
Mobay, held that federal common law applied because "federal
law always governs the validity of releases of federal causes of ac-
tion."' 4 8 The court determined that since Congress did not
demonstrate its intent that federal judges create federal rules of
last resort, only after the failure of voluntary efforts." Id. at 352 (citations
omitted).
141. Mobay, 761 F. Supp. at 351-52.
142. For the Kimbell Foods test, see supra note 99-105 and accompanying
text.
143. Mobay, 761 F. Supp. at 351-52. The Mobay court stated that a uniform
federal common law would not frustrate commercial relationships based on state
law because parties expect federal laws to govern "federal releases." Id. at 352.
The court also pointed out that contracts that deal with CERCLA in areas other
than liability must be drafted in accordance with federal law. Id. (citing Mardan,
804 F.2d at 1465 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting)).
144. Mobay, 761 F. Supp. at 352. But see notes 145-153 and accompanying
text.
145. Id. at 352.
146. Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1457-58 (9th Cir.
1986); Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Kop-Coat, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1022, 1024 (N.D.
Cal. 1990) rev'd on other grounds sum nom. Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials
& Servs., Inc., 1992 WL 44492 (9th Cir. March 12, 1992); Southland Corp. v.
Ashland Oil, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 994, 1001 (D.NJ. 1988); Versatile Metals, Inc. v.
Union Corp., 693 F. Supp. 1563, 1567 (E.D. Pa. 1988). "Clearly the fact that
federal law governs does not always mean that federal courts should fashion a
uniform federal rule, even if the federal question involves the scope of a federal
statutory right or the interpretation of a phrase in a federal statute." Mardan,
804 F.2d at 1457-58 (citation omitted).
147. 804 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986).
148. Id. at 1457.
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decision,' 4 9 the Kimbell Foods test was implicated.15 0 Unlike the
courts in Chem-Dyne and Mobay, however, the Mardan court held
that state law applied where the plaintiff, the purchaser of a haz-
ardous waste site, contractually released the defendant, seller, of
all liability in the purchase agreement.' 5 1 The court concluded
that state law applied to give the federal common law its content
because companies use state law to draft contracts of sale and in-
surance contracts.' 5 2 In addition, the court concluded that uni-
formity of the law was not necessary and that the application of
state law would not frustrate the purpose of CERCLA because
under the court's interpretation of section 107(e)(1), contractual
releases are invalid against the government.' 53 The court quali-
fied its holding by pointing out that where state law is hostile to
federal law, federal law governs.15 4
B. Analysis of Chem-Dyne, Mobay, and Mardan
These cases are similar in that the courts agree that federal
common law applies where there is a contractual release of envi-
ronmental liability. Additionally, all three cases applied the Kim-
bell Foods test. The courts are split, however, as to whether
uniform federal rules of decision or state law should give the fed-
eral law its content.
149. Id. at 1458.
150. See United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 735 (1979).
The Court in Kimbell Foods noted that if Congress had intended that there be a
federal priority system, then Congress would have created such a system. Id.
Thus, the Court concluded that in the absence of Congressional intent to create
a federal priority system, state laws were implicated. Id. However, the Court
qualified this conclusion by requiring that the state law meet the three-part test.
Id. at 728-29.
151. Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1458-59 (9th Cir.
1986).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1458. For a detailed analysis of the court's interpretation of sec-
tion 107(e)(1) see infra notes 165-170 and accompanying text. The court also
stated that applying federal law would frustrate the "commercial relationships
predicated on state law." Id. at 1460.
154. Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1458. See Wiegmann & Rose Int'l v. NL Indus.,
735 F. Supp. 957, 961 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
Other courts have rejected both the Chem-Dyne and Mobay analysis and ap-
plied a mixture of both federal and state law. See Southland Corp. v. Ashland
Oil, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 994, 1001 (D.N.J. 1988). Generally, these courts apply
federal law to interpreting CERCLA and state law in interpreting the contractual
release. As an example, in Southland, the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey used state law because the contractual release contained a
choice of law provision which dictated that state law would apply. Id. However,
the court applied federal law. Id.
20
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In applying the Kimbell Foods test, the Chem-Dyne court found
that environmental protection was of national magnitude, thus
satisfying the first part of the Kimbell Foods test.155 The Chem-Dyne
court, however, did not apply the next two prongs of the test to
the facts of the case, but concluded that a uniform federal rule of
decision should be applied to define CERCLA. The Mobay court,
which was faced with a contractual release of liability, applied all
three elements of the Kimbell Foods test.' 56 The court reasoned
that state law would frustrate the purpose of CERCLA and that
applying federal common law would not create a tension in com-
mercial relations based on state law. 157 The Mardan court, on the
other hand, held that state law should give the federal law its con-
tent instead of creating a federal common law. The court based
this holding partially on its interpretation of 107(e)(1) and par-
tially on its conclusion that state law would not frustrate the pur-
poses of CERCLA. 158
IV. INTERPRETATION OF THE CONTRACTUAL RELEASE
In addition to the debate about which law to apply, courts are
also divided about the interpretation of contractual releases of
environmental liability.159 In order to uphold the contractual re-
lease, some courts have held that there must be an express as-
sumption of environmental liability by one of the parties.' 60
155. United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 808 (S.D. Ohio
1983).
156. Mobay Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 345, 351 (D.N.J.
1991).
157. Mobay, 761 F. Supp. at 351.
158. Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1459 (9th Cir.
1986). "[Tlhe application of state law to interpret such releases will not frus-
trate the objectives of CERCLA. Contractual arrangements apportioning
CERCLA liabilities between private 'responsible parties' are essentially tangen-
tial to the enforcement of CERCLA's liability provisions." Id.
159. See Parker & Slavich, supra note 80, at 1359-60.
160. Southland Corp. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 994, 1002 (D.N.J.
1988) (citing Chemical Waste Management v. Armstrong World Indus., 669 F.
Supp. 1285, 1294 (E.D. Pa. 1987)); FMC Corp. v. Northern Pump Co., 668 F.
Supp. 1285, 1292 (D. Minn. 1987). In FMC Corp., the release stated that seller
"shall be released 'from all claims, demands and causes of action which FMC has,
had or may have arising under the [contract of sale from seller to FMC].' " FMC
Corp., 668 F. Supp. at 1292. (quoting release at issue) (emphasis added). The
United States District Court for the District of Minnesota concluded that the
release was an express release of all future claims including CERCLA liability.
Id. Contra Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1462. Notably, the release in Mardan transfers
liability from the seller to Mardan " 'based upon, arising out of or in any way
relating to the Purchase Agreement.' " Id. (quoting the release at issue).
Although the release in Mardan is similar to the one in FMC Corp. and both
courts upheld the respective releases, the Ninth Circuit in Mardan did not re-
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However, where the release has been entered into prior to the
enactment of CERCLA, courts are reluctant to uphold a release of
CERCLA liability unless the contract contains "some clear trans-
fer or release of future 'CERCLA-like' liabilities ...."161
quire express release language. Id. But see Rodenbeck v. Marathon Petroleum
Co., 742 F. Supp. 1448, 1457 (N.D. Ind. 1990). In Rodenbeck, the release be-
tween buyer and seller transferred to buyer " 'all claims and obligations of any
character or nature whatsoever arising out of or in connection with said agree-
ments..... " Id. (quoting release at issue). The court held that the release
expressly released seller of CERCLA liability. Id.
"As is" clauses are especially troubling. See Parker & Slavich, supra note 80,
at 1363. An example of an "as is" clause was the one examined in Niecko v.
Emro Mktg. Co., 769 F. Supp. 973, 975 (E.D. Mich. 1991). The "as is" clause in
Niecko stated, in pertinent part:
It is expressly agreed that Seller makes no warranties that the sub-
ject property complies with federal, state or local governmental law or
regulations .... Buyer has fully examined and inspected the property
and takes the property in its existing condition with no warranties of
any kind concerning the condition of the property or its use.... Buyer
acknowledges that he has inspected and is familiar with the condition of
the property; that Seller has not made and makes no warranties or rep-
resentations as to the condition of said property, including but not lim-
ited to, soil conditions ... Buyer is purchasing the same "as is"; that he
assumes all responsibility for any damages caused by the conditions on
the property upon transfer of title.
Id. at 975.
By their very nature, "as is" clauses do not include express agreements to
assume CERCLA liability, and as a result they provide even more difficulty for
the courts. Where an agreement contains an "as is" clause without an express
intent to accept environmental liability, some courts hold that the clause covers
breach of warranty but not environmental liability. See Allied Corp. v. Frola, 730
F. Supp. 626, 630 (D.N.J. 1990) ("as is" clause prohibits contractual release the-
ories of contribution but permits tort theory of recovery); Wiegmann & Rose
Int'l Corp. v. NL Indus., 735 F. Supp. 957, 961 (N.D. Cal. 1990); International
Clinical Lab. v. Stevens, 710 F. Supp. 466, 469 (E.D.N.Y. 1989); Channel Master
Satellite Syss. v. JFD Elecs., 702 F. Supp. 1229, 1232 (E.D.N.C. 1988); South-
land Corp. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 994, 1001 (D.N.J. 1988). Contra
Niecko v. Emro Mktg. Co., 769 F. Supp. 973, 978-79 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (court
held that if the "as is" clause is to have any meaning, the court must interpret
the "as is" clause as including CERCLA liability). For a more thorough discus-
sion of Niecko, see infra notes 178-184.
In Wiegmann & Rose, the buyer of a hazardous waste site entered into an "as
is" clause in the contract of sale. Wiegmann & Rose, 735 F. Supp. at 958. The
district court held that because the buyer did not have "knowledge, actual or
constructive, of the presence of hazardous waste" and the "as is" clause was
"standard, boiler-plate" the clause was intended to protect seller from breach of
warranty claims. Id. at 961. The court reasoned that allowing a responsible
party under CERCLA to evade liability by virtue of an "as is" clause entered into
prior to the enactment of CERCLA would frustrate the CERCLA objective of
rapid response to hazardous waste clean up. Id. at 962. Although most courts
find that an "as is" clause protects the seller from breach of warranty, some
courts will allow a CERCLA cause of action to be established. See Parker &
Slavich, supra note 80, at 1363.
161. Southland, 696 F. Supp. at 1002. Chemical Waste Management v.
Armstrong World Indus., 669 F. Supp. 1285, 1294-95 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (requiring
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Once the court has interpreted whether the release includes
environmental liabilities, it will then have to determine whether it
will uphold the release. Whether a court upholds the release de-
pends on the court's interpretation of CERCLA section 107(e)(1).
A. Two Interpretations of CERCLA Section 107(e)(1)
Courts have interpreted CERCLA section 107(e)(1) in two
ways. 162 The majority interpretation involves a cursory look at
section 107(e)(1) and holds that contractual releases are valid be-
tween PRPs while invalid between a responsible party and the
government.' 63 The minority interpretation holds that contrac-
tual releases are valid between a PRP and a party who would not
otherwise be liable under CERCLA.164
1. Upholding Contractual Releases Between Private Parties:
Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd.
Mardan is the seminal case for the majority interpretation
that section 107(e)(1) contractual releases are invalid where the
government is seeking reimbursement of cleanup costs but valid
between private parties.' 65 To that end, the Ninth Circuit in
express release of liability relating to the disposal of waste). See Mobay Corp. v.
Allied-Signal, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 345, 358 (D.N.J. 1991). In Mobay, the court
required that the release include a reference to "environmental-type liabilities"
in order for it to cover CERCLA liability. Mobay, 761 F. Supp. at 358. The
release in this case failed to refer to environmental liabilities. Id. However, in a
footnote the court added that if the release transfers "any type" of liability then
this release would also encompass a release of CERCLA liability. Id. at 358 n. 15
(emphasis omitted).
162. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
163. See infra notes 165-170 and accompanying text.
164. See infra notes 186-203 and accompanying text.
165. Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1459 (9th Cir.
1986). This case deals with a purchase agreement between Mardan, the subse-
quent operator, and MacMillan, the seller, for the purchase of some assets used
in the manufacture of musical instruments. Id. at 1456. Mardan released
MacMillan of "all actions, causes of action, suits.., based upon, arising out of or
in any way relating to the Purchase Agreement" in return for $995,000. Id.
MacMillan deposited hazardous waste on the site and Mardan continued to do
so. Id. Mardan then was required to clean up the site and instituted a suit for
compensation against MacMillan. Id.
Other courts that follow the Mardan analysis are: Purolator Products Corp.
v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 124, 130 (W.D.N.Y. 1991); Niecko v. Emro
Mktg. Co., 769 F. Supp. 973, 988-89 (E.D. Mich. 1991); Southland Corp. v. Ash-
land Oil, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 994, 1000 (D.N.J. 1988); Versatile Metals, Inc. v.
Union Corp., 693 F. Supp. 1563, 1573 (E.D. Pa. 1988); Channel Master Satellite
Syss. v.JFD Elecs., 702 F. Supp. 1229, 1232 (E.D.N.C. 1988) (holding that con-
tractual liability is "not eliminated" by CERCLA section 107(e)(l)); FMC Corp.
v. Northern Pump Co., 668 F. Supp. 1285, 1289 (D. Minn. 1987). In Versatile
Metals, the court stated in pertinent part:
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Mardan found that contractual releases between PRPs were "tan-
gential" to the government's enforcement of CERCLA. 16 6 Under
this interpretation, the government, as claimant in a CERCLA
suit, may recover cleanup costs from all responsible parties under
CERCLA regardless of a contractual release.167 The responsible
parties can then sue for contribution based on the contractual re-
leases for the cleanup costs.'
6 8
The Mardan court used public policy to support its conclu-
sion that private parties are free to contract between themselves
and that CERCLA does not prohibit this right. 169 The court's
analysis upheld the right of private parties to contract while it
also upheld CERCLA's purpose of having responsible parties re-
imburse the government for cleanup costs.'
70
a. Recent cases applying the Mardan analysis
A number of recent cases have applied the Mardan analy-
CERCLA's liability provisions, therefore, do not abrogate the par-
ties' contractual rights .... A person that is liable under the terms of
the Act may by agreement be held harmless or indemnified by another
party.... [CERCLA section 107(e)(l)] clearly provides that CERCLA
liability is not sufficient for the recovery of costs between private parties
where one such party has released the other from its CERCLA liability.
Versatile Metals, 693 F. Supp. at 1573. (citations omitted).
Recently, the Ninth Circuit reiterated its interpretation in Jones-Hamilton v.
Beazer Materials & Servs., 1992 WL 44492 (9th Cir. March 12, 1992). The
Ninth Circuit stated in part:
This court has held that enforcement of indemnification clauses
does not frustrate public policy as expressed in CERCLA. In Mardan,
we reasoned that CERCLA policy would not be frustrated because all
responsible parties would remain fully liable to the government,
although they would be free to enter into private contractual arrange-
ments 'essentially tangential to the enforcement of CERCLA's liability
provisions.'
Id. at *1-2 (citing Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1459).
166. Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1459.
167. Id.
168. Id. The PRPs that have entered into contractual releases may seek
contribution under CERCLA section 113(f). CERCLA § 113(0, 42 U.S.C.
9613(f). For the text of CERCLA section 113(f), see supra note 74.
169. Id. at 1459. SeeJones-Hamilton v. Kop-Coat, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1022,
1027 (N.D. Cal. 1990) rev'd on other grounds sum nom. Jones-Hamilton v. Beazer
Materials & Servs., Inc., 1992 WL 44492 (9th Cir. March 12, 1992). The Jones-
Hamilton court reluctantly followed Mardan. Jones-Hamilton, 750 F. Supp. at
1026-27.
170. Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1459.
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sis.171 In Purolator Products, Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc. ,172 the pres-
ent owner of a hazardous waste site brought an action for
contribution against the former owner of the site, Allied-Sig-
nal.' 73 Allied-Signal inherited the site from its "corporate prede-
cessor" who created the waste. 174 The contractual release stated
that "any and all liabilities arising out of or connected with the
assets and businesses of [Purolator]" are transferred to Allied-
Signal.' 75 Although the contractual release never referred to
"environmental-like"' 76 liability, the United States District Court
for the Western District of New York held that the release covers
CERCLA liability.' 77 The court also followed the Mardan analysis
and determined that the release was valid between the responsi-
ble parties, but invalid between the government and the responsi-
ble parties. 178
Similarly, in Niecko v. Emro Marketing Co. ,179 plaintiffs sought,
inter alia, contribution from the former owner of the hazardous
waste site which plaintiffs bought.'8 0 The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan held that the "as is"
clause in the contract of sale transferred CERCLA liability to
plaintiffs.' 8 ' The court held that the plaintiffs were not liable
under CERCLA because the hazardous substances at issue were
excluded by the "petroleum exclusion" set forth in CERCLA sec-
tion 101 (14).182 The court interpreted the Michigan Leaking Un-
derground Storage Tank Act (LUST Act), which has a provision
171. See Purolator Products Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 124,
129-30 (W.D.N.Y. 1991); Niecko v. Emro Mktg. Co., 769 F. Supp. 973, 988-89
(E.D. Mich. 1991); Rodenbeck v. Marathon Petroleum Co., 742 F. Supp. 1448,
1456 (N.D. Ind. 1990).
172. 772 F. Supp. 124 (W.D.N.Y. 1991).
173. Id. at 126.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 128.
176. For a discussion of cases that uphold "environmental-like" liabilities,
see supra note 161.
177. Purolator Products, 772 F. Supp. at 133-34. For a discussion of the in-
terpretation of releases, see supra notes 159-161 and accompanying text.
178. Id. at 130. See Niecko, 769 F. Supp. at 989.
179. 769 F. Supp. 973 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
180. Id. at 976.
181. Id. at 978. The "as is" clause stated that "seller has not made and
makes no warranties or representations as to the condition of said property, in-
cluding but not limited to, soil conditions, zoning, building code violations....
Buyer is purchasing the [property] 'as is'; that he assumes all responsibility for
any damages caused by the conditions on the property upon transfer of title."
Id.
182. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14). Niecko, 769 F. Supp. at 981. Courts interpret
section 101(14) as excluding those substances that are inherent in petroleum
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very similar to CERCLA section 107(e)(1),18 3 using the Mardan
analysis.' 84 The court upheld the release between the parties and
granted defendant's motion for summary judgment.'18
2. Upholding Contractual Releases Between a PRP and a Party
that Would Not Otherwise Be Liable Under CERCLA:
AM International v. International Forging
Equipment
In AM International v. International Forging Equip., 186 the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio disagreed
with the court in Mardan.187 Using legislative history to support
its holding, the court concluded that contractual releases are inva-
lid when entered into between parties who are liable under
from the definition of "hazardous substances." Id. Therefore, sites contami-
nated with petroleum substances are not regulated by CERCLA.
183. Niecko, 769 F. Supp. at 987. The court quoted as follows:
No indemnification, hold harmless, or similar agreement or con-
veyance shall be effective to transfer from the owner or operator or
from any person who may be liable for a release or threat of release
under this [a]ct, to any person the liability imposed under this [aict.
Nothing in this subsection shall bar any agreement to insure, hold
harmless, or indemnify a party to such agreement for any liability under
this [a]ct.
Id. (quoting MICH. CoMP. LAws § 299.842(6) (1979)).
184. Id. at 988-89. The court stated:
There is nothing in the first sentence that purports to prevent lia-
ble parties under [CERCLA] from apportioning, allocating, or even
shifting completely among themselves the liability that each party will
owe the CERCLA claimant, so long as each contracting party under-
stands that it will remain jointly and severally liable to that CERCLA
claimant. An interpretation to the contrary would effectively burden all
contractual exchanges involving property that may fall under
CERCLA's purview. This was not Congress' intention. The second
sentence of Section 107(e)(1) clarifies and reinforces the scope of the
prohibition in the first sentence.
Id.
185. Niecko, 769 F. Supp. at 992.
186. 743 F. Supp. 525 (N.D. Ohio 1990). AM International (AMI), the
plaintiff, had executed a sale and partial leaseback of its property to D&B Realty.
Id. at 526. In 1982, AMI closed its machine shop and painting facility and en-
tered into an asset purchase contract with Robert T. Dziak, defendant. Id. Dziak
agreed to buy the assets "as is, where is." Id. Two years after the asset purchase
contract was entered into, one of Dziak's corporations paid AMI $2.3 million as
part of an accord and satisfaction and AMI released Dziak of all claims. Id. The
EPA approached AMI concerning hazardous waste on the property and AMI
cleaned up the site. AM Int', 743 F. Supp. at 526.
AMI brought suit against Dziak and his corporation for contribution under
CERCLA section 107(e)(1). Id. Dziak counterclaimed for indemnification pur-
suant to the contractual release. Id. AMI moved for summary judgement which
the court denied. Id.
187. AM Int'l, 743 F. Supp. at 529.
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CERCLA and valid between PRPs and parties who would not
otherwise be liable under CERCLA.' 88 The court found section
107(e)(1) is "internally inconsistent." 1 9 To determine the mean-
ing of section 107(e)(1), the court examined a draft provision of
the CERCLA bill.' 90 The court inferred from the draft that Con-
gress only intended contractual releases to release CERCLA lia-
bility in limited situations.' 9'
The AM International court referred to a discussion between
United States Senators Howard W. Cannon (D-Nev.) and Jen-
nings Randolph (D-W.Va.), who sponsored the bill. 192 This col-
loquy is the only reference to the conflicting sentences of section
107(e)(1) in the legislative history.' 93 Based on the Can-
188. Id.
189. AM Int'l, 743 F. Supp. at 528. For a discussion of the apparent incon-
sistency in CERCLA section 107(e)(l), see supra note 73 and accompanying text.
190. Id. The draft the court analyzed stated:
[N]o indemnification, hold harmless, conveyance, or similar agree-
ment shall be effective to transfer from the owner or operator of a facil-
ity, or from any person who may be liable for the release under this
section, to any other person the liability imposed under this section:
Provided, That this subsection shall not apply to a transfer in a bona
fide conveyance of a facility or site (1) between two parties not affiliated
with each other in any way, (2) where there has been an adequate dis-
closure in writing . . . of all facts and conditions (including potential
economic consequences) material to such liability, and (3) to a trans-
feror who can provide assurances of financial responsibility and con-
tinuity of operation consistent with the degree and duration of risks
associated with such facility or site.
Id. at 528 (quoting S. REP. No. 1480, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) (emphasis
omitted) [hereinafter S. 14801.
191. AM Int'l, 743 F. Supp. at 529.
192. Id. at 528-29. The court quoted as follows:
Mr. CANNON: Section 107(e)(l) prohibits transfer of liability
from the owner or operator of a facility to other persons through in-
demnification, hold harmless, or similar agreements or conveyances.
Language is also included indicating that this prohibition on the trans-
fer of liability does not act as a bar to such agreements, in particular to
insurance agreements.
The net effect is to make the parties to such an agreement, which
would not have been liable under this section, also liable to the degree
specified in the agreement. It is my understanding that this section is
designed to eliminate situations where the owner or operator of a facil-
ity uses its economic power to force the transfer of its liability to other
persons, as a cost of doing business, thus escaping liability under the
[a]ct all together.
Mr. RANDOLPH: That is correct.
Id. at 529 (quoting 126 CONG. REC. 30,984 (1980)).
193. SeeJones-Hamilton v. Kop-Coat, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1022, 1026 (N.D.
Cal. 1990) rev'd on other grounds sum nom. Jones-Hamilton v. Beazer Materials &
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non/Randolph discussion, the court found that the first sentence
proscribes contractual releases, except where a contract provides
for indemnity or additionally liable parties.1 94 The second sen-
tence does not relieve a party of liability, but allows contracts to
provide for additional contractual liability.' 95
The court concluded that Congress intended that section
107(e)(1) prohibit all contractual releases when the government is
a party and when PRPs sue one another for contribution.' 96 The
court held that contractual releases would be upheld between a
PRP and a party who would not normally be liable under
CERCLA when that party agrees to indemnify the PRP or contrib-
ute additional liability.' 97 The court also referred to CERCLA
section 107(e)(2) to support its determination. 198 The court in-
terpreted this provision as permitting causes of action for contri-
bution between PRPs regardless of the contractual release.' 99
Finally, the court supported its conclusion by examining the
public policies which motivated the promulgation of CERCLA.200
The primary policy was the cleanup of hazardous waste, and a
secondary policy was to proscribe contractual releases which pre-
vent parties from fulfilling the primary policy.20 ' Therefore, pro-
scribing contractual releases, except where the release holds a
party liable that would not otherwise be liable under CERCLA,
supports the goals of section 107(e)(1). 20 2 In essence, the AM
International court allowed the expansion of contractual liability to
other parties who are not liable under CERCLA, but proscribed
194. AM Int'l, 743 F. Supp. at 529.
195. Id. The second sentence allows for additional liability when parties
that would not normally be liable under CERCLA section 107 agree to take on a
PRP's environmental liabilities. An example of a party that is not normally liable
under CERCLA is an insurance carrier.
196. AM Int'l, 743 F. Supp. at 529.
197. Id. The court stated:
In sum, Congress intended subsection 107(e)(l) to prevent the parties
from contractually relieving themselves of liability under the act,
whether that liability is enforced by action of the government or in a
suit by a person who performed the clean-up and sues others for contri-
bution under the act. In addition, by the second sentence, Congress
intended to permit any person to contract with others not already liable
under the act to provide additional liability by way of insurance or
indemnity.
Id.
198. Id. For the text of CERCLA section 107(e)(2), see supra text accompa-
nying note 73.
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shifting or limiting contractual liability between responsible par-
ties that are already liable.203
B. Analysis of the Two Interpretations of CERCLA Section
107(e)(1)
Three types of lawsuits are contemplated by the above deci-
sions: the government versus PRPs; a PRP versus another PRP;
and a PRP versus a party not liable under CERCLA, such as an
insurance carrier. Neither of these courts would uphold a con-
tractual release where the government is suing a PRP for cleanup
CoStS. 20 4 It is clear, however, that the Mardan court would uphold
a contractual release of environmental liabilities between private
parties and between PRPs and an insurance carrier. 20 5 The AM
International court would uphold contractual releases only in suits
involving a PRP and an insurance carrier.20 6
203. See Purolator Products Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 124,
129 (W.D.N.Y. 1991). For a discussion of Purolator Products, see supra notes 172-
178 and accompanying text.
At least one other case applies the AM International analysis. See Central Ill.
Public Serv. v. Industrial Oil Tank & Line Cleaning Serv., 730 F. Supp. 1498,
1507 (W.D. Mo. 1990). However, the court in that case failed to explicitly cite
authority for its interpretation of CERCLA section 107(e)(l). The court stated:
The two sentences in Section 9607(e)(1) can be reconciled in only
one way: That is, a liable party remains liable (e.g., to the United States)
regardless of whether it has an indemnity agreement, but the liable
party still may proceed against a third party (e.g., an insurance com-
pany) which has agreed to indemnify the liable party. The interpreta-
tion is consistent with the statute, the cases applying it, and the
legislative history.
Id.
204. Several courts assume that contractual releases are invalid when the
government is suing a PRP for contribution. See Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music,
Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1459 (9th Cir. 1986); American Nat'l Can Co. v. Derr Glass
Mfg. Corp., 1990 WL 125368 (N.D. Ill. 1990); Chemical Waste Management v.
Armstrong World Indus., 669 F. Supp. 1285 (E.D. Pa. 1987); FMC Corp. v.
Northern Pump Co., 668 F. Supp. 1285 (D. Minn. 1987).
205. Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1459; Versatile Metals v. Union Corp., 693 F.
Supp. 1563, 1573 (E.D. Pa. 1988). Although the Versatile Metals and Mardan
courts do not specifically state that they would uphold releases between a PRP
and a party not otherwise liable it seems likely that they would uphold such a
release given the courts' interpretation that releases are valid between private
parties.
206. AM Int'l, 743 F. Supp. at 529.
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V. MAKING SENSE OF CONTRACTUAL RELEASES AND
CERCLA LIABILITY
A. Uniform Federal Rules of Decision Should Be Incorporated
to Provide Content for CERCLA
The Mobay court properly held that federal law applied to the
interpretation of CERCLA and releases of environmental liabili-
ties. 20 7 The district court also properly interpreted the Kimbell
Foods test where there is a contractual release of CERCLA liabil-
ity.208 In applying the Kimbell Foods test, the Mobay court held that
uniform federal rules of decision should give CERCLA its con-
tent.20 9 Congress, the court found, intended that judges would
develop a federal common law to fill in the gaps of CERCLA. 210
Evidence of this intent is shown by Representative Florio's state-
ment that federal law is needed to establish a uniform rule. 21'
The Congressional Committee's adoption of the legislative his-
tory interpretation articulated by the court in Chem-Dyne,2 12 when
coupled with Representative Florio's statement, establishes Con-
gress' intent to create a uniform federal common law to give
207. Mobay Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 345, 351 (D.NJ.
1991). Courts are not in disagreement whether federal law is applicable in inter-
preting CERCLA liability. For a discussion of the applicability of federal law,
see supra note 76 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
209. Mobay, 761 F. Supp. at 352. Accord United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp.,
572 F. Supp. 802, 809 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
210. Mobay, 761 F. Supp. at 351. The court stated the following:
While CERCLA's legislative history strongly suggests a Congres-
sional directive to federal courts to develop uniform federal rules,
CERCLA does not contain specific assertion of Congressional intent.
'Although some difference exists between the establishment of
CERCLA liability and the release of a CERCLA right of action, a uni-
form federal rule regarding releases from CERCLA liability serves Con-
gress' goals in the same manner that a uniform rule regarding liability
does.'
Id. (citing Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1464 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting)).
211. For a discussion of Representative Florio's statement, see supra notes
125-128 and accompanying text.
212. In Chem-Dyne, the court analyzed the scope of liability under CERCLA.
Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 807-08. The court noted that Congress deleted a
reference to scope of liability in order to "avoid a statutory legislative standard
applicable in situations which might produce inequitable results in some cases.
The deletion was not intended as a rejection ofjoint and several liability." Id. at
808 (citation omitted). The court further noted that Congress intended to cre-
ate a common law which would perform an individual evaluation of each case.
Id. By extension, it is logical that this analysis is also applicable to releases
under section 107(e)(1). Because Congress intended to create a federal com-
mon law to define the scope of liability, the scope of liability which applies to
parties who have contractually released liability should also be governed by a
federal common law. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
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CERCLA its content.213 While neither Representative Florio nor
the Chem-Dyne court refers to 107(e)(1) specifically, they do refer
to CERCLA liability generally. 214 Thus, Representative Florio's
statement and the Chem-Dyne court suggest that uniform federal
rules of decision should be applied in interpreting CERCLA sec-
tion 107(e) in relation to contractual releases of environmental
liabilities. 215
B. Contractual Releases of CERCLA Liability Should Be
Upheld Where the Release Includes an Express
Release of CERCLA Liability
The policy issues that a court faces in determining whether to
uphold a contractual release are two-fold. First, one purpose of
CERCLA is to extend liability to all responsible parties. 216 Sec-
ond, the court, as a matter of strict construction, should construe
ambiguous provisions of a release against the drafter.21 7
Both of these policies point to a narrow construction of con-
tractual releases of environmental liabilities. A narrow interpreta-
tion of a contractual release would uphold the goal of extending
liability to all responsible parties.2 18 A narrow interpretation of a
release would also uphold the the general rule of construing am-
biguous releases against the drafter. 219 If it is unclear that the
213. While neither Representative Florio nor the Chem-Dyne court refers
specifically to section 107(e)(1), they both refer to CERCLA liability in general.
Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 808.
214. Id.
215. See Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 807-08. See also supra notes 125-128 and
accompanying text.
216. Mobay Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 345, 350 (D.N.J.
1991). "To achieve CERCLA's remedial goals of protecting public health and
the environment, courts are 'obligated to construe its provisions liberally.' " Id.
(quoting Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074,
1081 (1st Cir. 1986)). See H.R. 1016, supra note 51, at 17. See also Wiegrnann &
Rose Int'l v. NL Indus., 735 F. Supp. 957, 962 (N.D. Cal. 1990). The Wiegmann
& Rose court held that "allowing an otherwise 'responsible party' to avoid liabil-
ity under Section 107, based on an 'as is' clause in the deed conveying the prop-
erty, would clearly circumvent both the intent and the language of the statute.
This is particularly true when the conveyance occurred prior to the enactment of
CERCLA and the purchasers had no knowledge of the contamination."
Wiegmann & Rose, 735 F. Supp. at 962.
217. Parker & Slavich, supra note 80, at 1352.
218. A narrow interpretation of contractual releases may result in their in-
validation, and if the release is rendered invalid then all responsible parties
would remain liable for the cleanup costs. See Wiegmann & Rose, 735 F. Supp. at
962.
219. Alcoa Steamship Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 421, 424-25 (1949).
Generally, it is the drafter that seeks to be relieved of liability. The drafter is
19921
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release relieves a party of CERCLA liability, the release would be
construed as not to include such liability. 220 Therefore, all re-
sponsible parties would be liable for the cleanup costs to the gov-
ernment as well as between themselves. 22'
Where the release expressly relieves a responsible party of
CERCLA liability, a court should uphold it.222 Express releases
should be upheld for two reasons: (1) the parties' intent was to
relieve one responsible party of liability and (2) the provision is
not ambiguous and should not be construed against the
drafter.223
C. Courts Should Interpret Section 107(e)(l) as Validating
Contractual Releases Only Between Private Parties
1. The Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd. Analysis
The Ninth Circuit held that contractual releases are valid be-
tween private parties but that they do not relieve a party of the
underlying liability to the government. 224 The Mardan court con-
sidered two competing goals: the first goal is to uphold contracts
made between private parties, 225 and the second goal is to hold
responsible parties liable to the government for hazardous waste
cleanup costs. 226 The Mardan analysis allows courts to uphold
both.2 2
7
usually the seller of the hazardous waste site. Therefore, the courts should con-
strue an ambiguous provision against the seller.
220. See supra note 160 discussing courts that require an express release of
CERCLA liability in order to uphold the release.
221. For a discussion of liability under CERCLA, see supra notes 61-65 and
accompanying text.
222. Southland Corp. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 994, 1002 (D.N.J.
1988); Chemical Waste Management v. Armstrong World Indus., 669 F. Supp.
1285, 1294 (E.D. Pa. 1987); FMC Corp. v. Northern Pump Co., 668 F. Supp.
1285, 1292 (D. Minn. 1987). Courts have found express releases of CERCLA
liability where the language of the release fails to mention CERCLA or environ-
mental liability. For a discussion of the courts that upheld express releases of
CERCLA liability, see supra note 79.
223. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
224. Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 808 F.2d 1454, 1459 (9th Cir.
1986).
225. Michael 0. Ellis, Private Indemnity Agreements Under Section 107 of
CERCLA, [Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA), 1953, at 1957, (December
6, 1991) [hereinafter Private Indemnity Agreements]. "The U.S. Supreme Court has
often declared this principle to be one of the highest order, and the protection
of this principle to be one of the highest duties of the courts." Id.
226. Id.
227. For a discussion of the Mardan analysis, see supra notes 165-170 and
accompanying text. See also Private Indemnity Agreements, supra note 225, at 1957.
"There is nothing in this arrangement that frustrates the goals of CERCLA, nor
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The Ninth Circuit may flesh out its holding by stating that the
first sentence of 107(e)(1) prohibits transferring CERCLA liability
while the second sentence permits the distribution of CERCLA lia-
bility among PRPs. 2 28 CERCLA's legislative history confirms this
distinction. 229
The Mardan analysis also furthers two other CERCLA goals.
First, CERCLA stresses voluntary cleanup of hazardous waste
sites by PRPs. 230 Under Mardan, PRPs are more likely to clean up
hazardous waste sites voluntarily because they know that their
contractual release will be upheld when they seek contribution
from other PRPs. 23' Another CERCLA goal is to induce PRPs to
settle CERCIA claims among themselves. 232 The Mardan analy-
sis furthers this goal by upholding contractual releases between
PRPs in exchange for a release from responsibility for future
CoStS.
2 3 3
2. The AM International v. International Forging Corp.
Analysis
While the Mardan analysis is based on public policy, the AM
International analysis is based on legislative history. However, the
AM International court improperly applied CERCLA legislative
history in upholding contractual releases of environmental liabili-
ties only when a PRP seeks relief from liability from its insurance
carrier for two reasons. 23 4 First, the court should not have relied
so heavily on the colloquy between Senators Cannon and Randolf
because the rules of statutory construction mandate that state-
ments made by senators during floor debate not be given signifi-
cant weight.23 5 Legislative history is unreliable, especially in
does it impinge on the broader policy of protecting the liberty to contract. In-
deed, in this situation the released party would be more willing to perform the
cleanup since it could be confident its contract with the releasing party would be
enforced by the courts." Private Indemnity Agreements, supra note 225, at 1957.
228. See Private Indemnity Agreements, supra note 225, at 1956.
229. Id. For a discussion of CERCLA legislative history see infra notes 241-
248 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
231. Private Indemnity Agreements, supra note 225, at 1957.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Private Indemnity Agreements, supra note 225, at 1955.
235. For a discussion of the Senator Randolph and Senator Cannon collo-
quy, see supra notes 192-195 and accompanying text. Private Indemnity Agreements,
supra note 225, at 1955 (citing Blitz v. Donovan, 740 F.2d 1241, 1247 (D.C. Cir.
1984) Singer, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, § 48.13 (4th ed. 1986)).
Additionally, these statements should not be entitled to substantial weight
because " 'in the course of oral argument on the Senate floor, the choice of
1992] 379
33
Aydelott: Cerclaing the Issues: Making Sense of Contractual Liability Under
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992
380 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. III: p. 347
relation to CERCLA, because it was " 'hastily and inadequately
drafted.' "236 Additionally, the procedural rules in voting for
CERCLA prohibited any amendments to the Act.237 Therefore,
there was no floor debate which would have created more sub-
stantial legislative history. 238 Also, the compromise committee,
due to time constraints, failed to analyze the CERCLA bill care-
fully. 23 9 Indeed, the compromise committee failed to make a re-
port. 240 Thus, the AM International court's reliance on the meager
legislative history was inappropriate.
Second, the court failed to analyze the legislative history
completely. 24' The AM International court analyzed a pre-compro-
mise bill, Senate Bill 1480.242 The court failed to take the legisla-
tive history of this bill into account. 243 The legislative history of
the pre-compromise bill contradicts the AM International court's
holding.24 4 Indeed, each pre-compromise bill distinguished be-
tween transferring and distributing liability.245 In addition, the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, in par-
words by a Senator is not always accurate or exact.' " Private Indemnity Agreements,
supra note 225, at 1955 (quoting In re Carlson, 292 F. Supp. 778, 783 (C.D. Cal.
1968)).
236. Private Indemnity Agreements, supra note 225, at 1954 (quoting United
States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1253 (S.D. Ill. 1984)).
237. Private Indemnity Agreements, supra note 225, at 1954.
238. Id. at 1955.
239. Id. at 1954. The article quotes the Artesian Water court as follows:
After a number of predecessor bills failed to muster sufficient sup-
port, a group of senators submitted the Stafford-Randolph compromise
bill to the lame duck Congress in the waning days of the Carter Admin-
istration. That bill, however, did not receive careful study by the com-
mittee, and voting on the floor was controlled by a procedure that
permitted no amendments, other than one previously cleared. The leg-
islative history, therefore, furnishes at best a sparse and unreliable
guide to the statute's meaning.
Id. (quoting Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle County, 851 F.2d 643, 648 (3d
Cir. 1988)).
240. Private Indemnity Agreements, supra note 225, at 1954.
241. Id.
242. For the text of S. 1480, see supra note 189.
243. Private Indemnity Agreements, supra note 225, at 1955.
244. Id. at 1956.
245. Id.
Every one of the pre-compromise bills made this key distinction.
Each bill, while prohibiting the transfer of the statutory strict liability,
permitted private agreements which distribute some or all of the costs.
Far from rendering indemnity and hold-harmless agreements unen-
forceable, the legislative history of CERCLA shows a concern for pre-
serving such agreements.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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ticular section 1 13(f),246 affirms this distinction. 247 That section
allows PRPs to seek contribution from "any other liable
[party]." 248 Section 1 13(f) permits parties to distribute liability
just as section 107(e)(1) permits parties to distribute rather than
to transfer liability.
Under the AM International analysis, it is likely that insurance
companies will refuse to cover hazardous waste sites because they
may bear the full burden of cleanup costs. 249 In the alternative,
the insurance companies may raise premiums drastically to cover
their potential liability under CERCLA.250 In doing so, the ulti-
mate burden may rest once again on the responsible parties. In
effect, the AM International analysis renders CERCLA section
107(e)(1) practically meaningless because PRPs will not be able to
get insurance coverage at all or will be faced with strict limitations
on their insurance coverage. As a result, PRPs may have to bear
the burden of cleanup costs regardless of the contractual release.
VI. CONCLUSION
Congress intended to make all responsible parties strictly lia-
ble under CERCLA. 251 Congress also intended that CERCLA lia-
bility provisions be interpreted broadly. 252 In doing so, Congress
set up narrow defenses to CERCLA liability.253 Because these de-
fenses are narrow and liability is broad, PRPs have attempted to
distribute liability through contractual releases. 25 4 In dealing
with such contractual releases, courts should apply uniform fed-
eral rules of decision to the interpretation of CERCLA because
246. For a discussion of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act section 113(0, see supra note 74.
247. Private Indemnity Agreements, supra note 225, at 1956. The United States
Supreme Court noted that the view of subsequent Congresses cannot preempt
the view of the Congress that enacted CERCLA, however, the view of subse-
quent Congresses can be afforded "significant weight and particularly so when
the precise intent of the enacting Congress is obscure." Id. (quoting Seatrain
Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U.S. 572, 596 (1980)).
248. CERCLA § 113(0, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(o.
249. Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 3, at 1575.
250. Id. at 1576.
251. CERCLA 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6907(a).
252. Mobay Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 345, 350 (D.N.J.
1991); Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074,
1081 (1st Cir. 1986); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1045 (2d
Cir. 1985). See supra note 50.
253. CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 6907(b). For a discussion of the de-
fenses to CERCLA liability, see supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
254. For a discussion of bankruptcy, insurance and contractual releases as
defenses to CERCLA liability, see supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
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Congress adopted the view that federal rules of decision should
apply to CERCLA liability. 255 To uphold the CERCLA objective
of holding all PRPs liable courts should validate express releases
of environmental liabilities. 256 Finally, to uphold CERCLA's
goals and validate contracts between private parties courts should
interpret CERCLA section 107(e)(1) as valid between PRPs and
invalid between PRPs and the government.257
Amy E. Aydelott
255. See supra notes 207-215 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 216-223 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 224-250 and accompanying text.
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